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Abstract 
This article offers an overview of scholarship on social investment policies in relation to the integration 
of immigrants and the role they can play in multicultural societies. At first sight, social investment is a 
promising strategy to deal with the inequalities in human capital and life chances that plague 
multicultural societies. However, on the basis of the available knowledge, the article shows that the 
benefit of social investment interventions for immigrants may be lower than expected for two main 
reasons. First, there are access biases in most typical social investment policies (e.g. childcare, active 
labour market policies, training) that tend to limit participation by non-natives. Second, employers’ 
recruitment preferences and labour market discrimination are also likely to limit the potential of social 
investment interventions for immigrants. I conclude that to exploit the full potential of social 
investment policies in the promotion of immigrant integration, these policies need to be adapted, 
particularly by taking into account the essential role played by employers.  
 
Introduction 
Over the last few years, the notion of social investment has featured prominently in debates on the 
reform of European welfare states (Morel et al. 2012; Hemerijck 2017). Social investment refers to a 
range of social policies that emphasise the role of investment in human capital as a tool to fight 
disadvantage and to reduce inequality. Rather than compensate disadvantage through cash transfers, 
social investment policies aim at increasing the chances of labour market participation and accessing 
good quality jobs. With its focus on labour market participation, social investment de facto gives a 
prominent role to employers’ needs and preferences. 
Social investment seems a particularly promising strategy for the promotion of the integration of 
immigrant communities in multicultural societies. Investment in the human capital of immigrants is 
likely to facilitate access to the labour market given that immigrants often lack skills that are adapted 
to the host country’s labour market (Friedberg 2000; Cheung 2013). Social investment can contribute 
to both the short and the long-term integration of immigrants. In the short term, training programmes 
and active labour market policies can help unskilled immigrants to develop the skills that are required 
by the labour market and as a result enter employment. In the long term, key social investment policies 
like childcare and support for school aged children and youth, can improve the socio-economic 
prospects of established immigrant communities investing in their social mobility (Brandon, 2004).  
While there are reasons to believe that social investment is a promising strategy to promote the social 
and economic integration of immigrant and ethnic minorities (see also Burroni and Scalise; Fossati and 
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Liechti, this issue), the available evidence also points to a number of potential problems. First, it has 
been argued that the potential impact of a social investment strategy to fight poverty and contain the 
rise in inequality, is limited. Social investment policies tend to benefit the middle classes and have 
troubles reaching the most disadvantaged (Cantillon 2011). One reason for this is the existence of 
access biases in many social investment policies, sometimes referred to as Matthew effects1 (Gal 1998; 
Bonoli et al 2017). Second, the social investment strategy assumes that once the investment in the 
human capital of the disadvantaged has been successfully achieved, these will find good quality jobs, 
adequate with regard to the skill level they have acquired. The problem is that, in a multicultural 
setting, at all skill levels, ethnic minorities suffer from substantial levels of labour market discrimination 
(Zschirnt and Ruedin 2015; Quillian et al 2017; Quillian et al 2019). Social investment policies may well 
succeed in improving the human capital of disadvantaged individuals and groups, but this will be of 
limited use if labour market discrimination prevents them from finding adequate employment. In 
general, discrimination by employers may concern access to jobs, but also promotions and access to 
quality jobs (see e.g. Moss and Tilly 2001).  
Against this background, the objective of this review is to pool the available knowledge and discuss 
whether social investment interventions are helpful in promoting the successful social and economic 
integration of ethnic minorities. This review relies on a number of distinct literatures and covers the 
fields of social policy, migration studies, economics, and child development. These literatures are all 
relevant to understand the efficacy of social investment strategies, but rarely speak to one another. 
By pooling this knowledge, the review provides a comprehensive assessment of social investment’s 
integration potential regarding immigrants.  
Given the vastity of this research field, it has been necessary to adopt some limitations. Two are of 
particular importance. First the review is limited to interventions that promote labour market 
integration in the short or long term. Other forms of social integration measures (like measures to 
improve mental health conditions), which could be relevant for specific immigrant populations such as 
refugees, are not considered. Second, given the topic of the special issue, I focus on social investment 
interventions in the field of social policy. Other policy fields, such as education or integration policy, 
which could contain elements of social investment, are not considered here.  
The paper begins with an overview of the literature on social investment, focusing on this strategy’s 
rationale, potential and risks. It then considers current knowledge on the impact of social investment 
interventions on immigrant groups, in two key policy areas: childcare and ALMPs. Next, it focuses more 
directly on the role of employers, by considering the interaction between social investment and labour 
market discrimination. Then the focus shifts to what we know about ways to improve the capacity of 
social investment interventions to promote immigrants’ labour market integration.  
The paper concludes by highlighting the fact that while theoretically promising, the social investment 
strategy needs substantial adaptation if it is to be a successful tool for the promotion of immigrant 
integration.  
 
The social investment strategy 
 
                                                          
1 From St Matthews gospel, with reference to the following verse: “For unto every one that hath shall be given, 
and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath” 
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Hemerijck (2017: 19) defines social investment as “an encompassing strategy of developing, 
employing, and protecting human capital over the life course for the good of citizens, families, 
societies, and economies”. The origins of the social investment strategy can be traced back to the mid-
1990s and early 2000s. With different terms and with different emphases, several authors have 
referred to a major policy shift in the discourse of international organisations such as the OECD, the 
World Bank but also the EU and several European countries (including the Nordic countries, Germany, 
the Netherlands). The “active” or “social investment” turn can be characterised as a major 
reorientation of social policies, emphasising human capital investment at all stages of the life course, 
improved access to the labour market and access to better quality employment (Bonoli 2013; 
Hemerijck 2012). 
Some of the theoretical underpinnings of the social investment strategy are provided in the work of 
James Heckman who has shown in a number of evaluation studies that programmes targeted on 
disadvantaged children can potentially yield very high returns for society (Heckman 2006). As a result, 
emphasis is placed on investing in children through high quality subsidized childcare, preschool 
programmes and so forth (Jenson 2002; Esping-Andersen 2002; 2009). However, the social investment 
strategy is not limited to children. Examples of typical social investment policies include supporting 
disadvantaged youth in entering vocational training, and general education and other policies to help 
unemployed people and immigrants (re-)enter the labour market (Morel et al. 2012).  
Like most influential ideas, that of social investment has attracted a reasonable amount of criticism. 
Hemerjick (2017) has reviewed the main critiques, including a crucial one that refers to the inability of 
these measures to reach the most disadvantaged in society. Several studies have shown that the key 
social investment polices tend to benefit the middle and upper classes more than disadvantaged 
people, a phenomenon usually referred to as the “Matthew effect” (Gal 1998). This bias has been 
found in typical social investment policies, such as subsidised childcare (Van Lancker 2013; Abrassart 
and Bonoli 2015; Pavolini and Van Lancker 2018), ALMPs (Heckman and Smith 2004; Bonoli and Liechti 
2018) or programmes for providing vocational training to school dropouts (Pisoni 2018).  
Social investment policies are intrinsically exposed to the risk of Matthew effects, for a number of 
reasons. First, since they imply investment in human capital, they often require some pre-existing level 
of skills. In order to learn professional skills, one must generally master some basic skills like literacy 
and numeracy. In addition, non-cognitive skills, such as perseverance or self-confidence are needed in 
order to successfully undergo learning processes (Heckman 2006; Esping-Andersen 2009). These skills 
are not evenly distributed in society and particularly immigrants may lack such qualifications for 
different reasons (Heath et al 2008; Pfeffer 2008). 
Second, the social investment approach assumes that disadvantaged individuals and groups will be 
able, after public interventions, to be financially independent by participating in the labour market. 
The problem is that the labour market is an inherently selective institution. In order to be effective, 
social investment policies may need to anticipate some of the selectivity of the labour market and take 
employers’ needs and demands into account. In social investment policies (like in other human capital 
formation policies) there is a trade-off between effectiveness and inclusiveness. Employers, whose role 
is equally essential for social investment and immigrant integration (see Introduction to this special 
issue), do not necessarily have an interest in inclusiveness (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2020). As a result, 
selectivity is likely to trickle down from employers into the whole social investment welfare state.  
Third, social investment policies, like any other government policy, are subjected to political and 
bureaucratic logics, which can further reinforce access biases. In fact, the proponents of social 
investment interventions can be under political and administrative pressure to show that their policies 
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are effective. The easiest way to increase success may be to restrict access to those who have a very 
good chance to succeed (Pisoni 2018). 
 
How do immigrants fare in the social investment welfare state? 
The literature reviewed above does not generally focus explicitly on the access biases that immigrants 
are likely to suffer. However, it is clear that in virtually all European countries, immigrants are 
overrepresented among the disadvantaged, whether in terms of access to jobs, incomes, or social 
integration in general (Heath and Cheung 2007; Barret and Maitre 2013). This section focuses on the 
issue of access biases for immigrants in three key social investment policy areas: childcare, active 
labour market policy, and access to jobs. These policy areas represent the different components of the 
social investment strategy: the focus on children and long-term investment on the one hand, and the 
search for more immediate gains by increasing labour market participation on the other. 
Childcare 
Childcare is the backbone of the social investment strategy. Investment in children increases the 
chances of subsequent success in school, training and ultimately in the labour market. Research on the 
impact of childcare and pre-school programmes on child development has shown that the return on 
investment can be substantial for children with a disadvantaged background (see e.g.: Barnett 1985; 
Heckman 2006). In addition, childcare allows (immigrant) parents to work, and as a result to increase 
household income and reduce welfare state dependency (Brandon 2004).  
The impact of participation in formal, centre-based, childcare on child development has been 
investigated in several studies since the early 2000s. There seems to be a consensus that in general, 
participation in childcare has a positive impact on child development, but that this impact is stronger 
for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (Kamerman et al 2003; Magnuson et al 2007; Esping-
Andersen 2009: 139-140).  
More recently, several new studies have exploited the gradual expansion of childcare services in 
Europe as a natural experiment. These studies have confirmed the view that childcare participation 
has a positive impact for children from disadvantaged background. A few studies have focused on 
Germany. For one of the German states, Lalive and Felfe (2015) find limited impact of participation in 
childcare overall, but a positive effect for immigrant children in terms of language and socio-emotional 
skills (a similar positive impact is also found for children of low educated mothers). Studying also 
Germany, but on the basis of a larger dataset, Cornelissen et al (2018) find the same result, i.e. a clear 
positive effect of participation only for disadvantaged children, including those with an immigrant 
background. Keiser and Bauer (2019) find that immigrant children who have experienced centre-based 
childcare display higher levels of overall wellbeing 
The same conclusion is reached by Felfe et al (2014) for Spain, where children of socially disadvantaged 
parents benefit from participation, however, there is no separate analysis for children with an 
immigration background. For Norway, Havnes and Mogstad (2015) also find that a positive effect of 
participation in childcare for children living in household in the lower and middle part of the income 
distribution. Finally, Datta-Gupta et al (2010), using Danish data, find a positive impact of centre-based 
childcare on non-cognitive skills at age 7 for relative to family day care, but not relative to home care. 
The effects for minority children are not different. 
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Unfortunately, however, in most European countries (except the Nordic countries), children growing 
up in disadvantaged families are less likely to be cared for in childcare centres. Several studies have 
identified an access bias to centre-based formal childcare. In the vast majority of European countries, 
the likelihood to be cared in one such centres is considerably higher for middle and upper-class children 
(Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011; Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012; Van Lancker 2013; Krapf 2014; 
Abrassart and Bonoli 2015; Pavolini and Van Lancker 2018). Most of these studies consider class or 
income as the determining factor of this bias, and not necessarily migrant background. In general, their 
results converge on the fact that the bias is general across countries, with the exception of Sweden 
and the other Nordic countries, where the bias is less pronounced (Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012; 
Krapf 2014; Sainsbury 2019). Importantly, these studies concur in showing that the bias remains after 
controlling for differences in parental or maternal employment.  
Since some immigrant populations tend to be overrepresented among the lower social classes and 
income groups, it can be expected that immigrants will be hit by an access bias as well. This hypothesis 
is consistent with the result of the few available studies. In a study on access to childcare in a Swiss 
Canton, Abrassart and Bonoli (2015) found that, controlling for maternal employment and household 
income, the child’s nationality remains a significant predictor of the probability of being in formal 
centre-based day care. Children from Eastern and Southern Europe are considerably less likely than 
Swiss and Northern European children to be in centre-based childcare. In another nationwide study 
Schlanser (2011) found that children born to parents stemming from Turkey or a former Yugoslavian 
country were less likely to be in centre-based childcare in Switzerland.  
These results are consistent with the findings of Pavolini and Van Lancker (2019), who show that after 
controlling for maternal employment and social class, some immigrants have a lower probability of 
being in childcare than native children. The penalty depends on the country of origin, with children 
whose parents originated from India, East Asia, the middle East or Northern Africa being the least likely 
to be in formal childcare. However, for all immigrant groups, the probability of using childcare 
increases with the duration of residence in the country, suggesting that whatever factors are 
responsible for the penalty, these decline with time spent in the host country.  
How does one explain these biases? In the literature, one finds essentially four explanations. First, the 
intensity of parental employment tends to be lower in lower classes and among low skilled immigrant 
groups. However, as already mentioned, a bias subsists after controlling for parental (in most cases 
maternal) employment. Second, affordability could be an obstacle for poor families. In most countries, 
childcare is priced according to household income, so that low-income families pay less. However, it 
may still be the case that in spite of a favourable fee schedule, poor families have more difficulties 
finding the necessary resources. The third hypothesis refers to availability. With the exception of the 
Nordic countries, in most European countries there is shortage of childcare provision. As a result, 
parents need to wait until a slot is available, but they can also try to persuade the childcare 
administrators to be given priority. To do this effectively requires some resources, such as knowledge 
of the local language and unwritten rules of behaviour, which immigrants are less likely to have. In 
other words, it is reasonable to assume that more resourceful parents will manage to obtain access 
first.  
Finally, we can assume that parents have different preferences between parental, formal and informal 
care, and this generates the observed pattern. This explanation could help understand the 
underrepresentation of immigrants in centre-based childcare. Cultural preferences for maternal or 
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informal care over care provided by strangers may be responsible for this effect. Pavolini and Van 
Lancker (2018: 887) find that, controlling for maternal employment, pro-maternal care cultural values 
are weakly but significantly associated with lower use of formal childcare.  
Overall, the impression one gets form the literature on access biases in childcare, is that these may 
have different origins, but they concur in tendentially excluding less resourceful parents, particularly 
low skilled immigrants. This is unfortunate, because as seen above, these are the children that are 
most likely to benefit from being taken care of in day care centres.  
  
Active labour market policies 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) are another important component of the social investment 
welfare state2. Their objective is to facilitate labour market access, including through the provision of 
training, job search assistance, subsidies to firms who accept to hire disadvantaged jobseekers, or 
temporary employment in the public of non-profit sector (Bonoli 2010; Card et al., 2017). In general, 
ALMPs have been shown to be effective also for immigrants, with the most effective measure for this 
group being job subsidies (Butscheck and Walter 2014). 
From a theoretical point of view, ALMPs can generate both positive and negative access biases (Bonoli 
and Liechti 2018). There could be a positive access bias for (low skilled) immigrants because ALMPs are 
meant for individuals who have serious difficulties re-entering the labour market. As a result, we can 
expect a positive access bias based on entitlement criteria that result from a policy intention to reach 
the most disadvantaged, i.e. those who have real problems finding jobs (Heckman and Smith 2004).  
However, a negative access bias for immigrants is also conceivable. Some programmes, especially the 
more ambitious ones, require language and other basic cognitive skills. Some immigrant groups may 
lack these capabilities, and will as a result be excluded from participation. In addition, immigrants’ 
access could also be biased by the case workers’ anticipation of labour market discrimination (Auer 
and Fossati 2019). If caseworkers know that a given jobseeker is unlikely to find a job regardless of 
actual skills and because of employer discrimination, they may decide not to invest in their human 
capital.  
Finally, some measures require direct employer involvement. This is the case of job subsidies in the 
private sector. In this case, for the measure to be deployed, it is essential to find an employer willing 
to hire the jobseeker. Access to this measure could as a result be limited if employers discriminate 
against immigrants.  
Consequently, we can build a simple model of participation of immigrants in ALMPs.3 According to this 
model, (low skilled) immigrants will be underrepresented in human capital-intensive programmes (e.g. 
vocational training) and in those that are closer to the labour market (e.g. job subsidies in the private 
sector). In contrast, they will be overrepresented in less ambitious and labour market distant 
programmes, such as temporary employment programmes in the public or non-profit sector.  
While there is little dedicated research on biases in access to ALMPs, the relevant information can 
often be collected from standard evaluation studies. Bonoli and Liechti (2018) have done that. Using 
meta-analytical techniques, they examined 47 studies containing the results of 87 programme 
                                                          
2 This section draws on research published in Author 2019 and Author 2018 




evaluations which provided also information with regard to the eligible population and actual 
participants. This information allowed the researchers to identify possible biases in access.  
The results show that the distribution of immigrants among ALMPs participants is indeed skewed. In 
short, immigrants are slightly underrepresented among participants in training programmes. They are 
strongly underrepresented in job subsidies for private sector employers. Finally, contrary to 
expectations, they are also underrepresented in temporary employment programmes. 
The results of the analysis by Bonoli and Liechti (2018) are not entirely in line with the expectations 
based on the simple model discussed above, and point in a few different directions. First, there are 
very few programmes in which immigrants are overrepresented. These are found almost exclusively in 
the training category. Unfortunately, the literature reviewed by Bonoli and Liechti does not allow them 
to say anything with regard to the type of training delivered. However, it could very well be the case 
that migrant overrepresentation concerns only local language training. More ambitious training 
programmes, such as those providing full vocational training, tend to be less accessible to immigrants 
(see e.g. Winter-Ebmer 2006 for Austria or Lechner et al 2011 for Germany).  
Second, there is a large negative access bias for immigrants in employment subsidies. This is at first 
sight surprising, because such subsidies are meant for disadvantaged jobseekers. It is unfortunate, 
because as seen above job subsides have been found to be the most promising ALMP tool for 
immigrants (Butschek and Walter 2014). This result may be explained by “creaming”, i.e. selecting 
the most job-reading candidates (Koning and Heinrich 2013) or by deliberate labour market 
discrimination, as generally these job subsidies are provided once an employer who is willing to hire 
a jobseeker is found.  
 
Finally, contrary to expectation, there is no overrepresentation of immigrants in the “temporary 
employment programmes” category. On the contrary, in some studies, immigrants are 
underrepresented in this type of programmes (see Zhang 2004 on Norway or Koch et al 2012 on 
Germany). This suggests that these programmes, even though designed for labour market distant 
candidates, are rarely meant for immigrants.  
Bonoli and Liechti also report welfare regime differences in access biases. Intriguingly, nearly all the 
instances in which a bias is observed concern conservative and liberal welfare states. Access biases to 
ALMPs are rarer in the Nordic countries, particularly for training measures (Bonoli and Liechti 2018: 
905). Future research should find out why the Nordic countries are more successful in limiting the 
access bias to ALPMs and training.  
These results suggest that access biases may constitute serious problems with regard to the ability of 
ALMPs to support disadvantaged immigrants. The main reason for this may not be so much the lack of 
pre-existing human capital, as hypothesised, but more employers’ discrimination of such candidates 
and absence of suitable programmes.  
 
Access to jobs 
 
The promise of the social investment strategy depends crucially on the ability of the target groups of 
social policy to profit from human capital investment and integrate the labour market. While this 
promise may be credible in general terms, when it comes to immigrants it is problematic as immigrants 
and ethnic minorities face relatively high levels of discrimination in the labour market (see e.g.; Ruedin 
and Zschirnt 2016; Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Quillian et al 2017; Quillian et al 2019).  
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In this respect it is striking that the literature on social investment has not focused more on employer 
preferences and particularly on discrimination. Potentially, labour market discrimination could undo 
much of the effect of social investment policies. This comes out clearly by comparing the average effect 
size of ALMPs to the impact of discrimination. With regard to ALMPs, a meta-analysis of 15 impact 
studies found that participation increases the hazard rate of finding a job by 9% on average (Filges et 
al 2015: 39). Meta-analyses of studies of discrimination typically find that all else equal, applicants 
from ethnic groups that are exposed to discrimination have a 30-50% lower probability to be invited 
for a job interview (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016; Quillian et al 2017; Quillian et al 2019). Thus, effect sizes 
of ALMPs and discrimination are clearly within the same range, with, if anything, discrimination having 
a larger impact.  
A credible social investment strategy should therefore include an anti-discrimination component. 
However, fighting labour market discrimination is difficult. Decades of anti-discrimination legislation 
and policy in the US have not managed to reduce discrimination against blacks (Quillian et al. 2017). In 
Europe, discrimination levels against immigrants form culturally distant countries have remained 
roughly constant across countries for decades (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2017; Quillian et al 2019). Attempts 
at fighting discrimination by intervening in the recruitment process, for example by applying blind 
hiring strategies (i.e. anonymous CVs) or by trying to reduce employers’ biases, have produced 
inconsistent results (Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Krause et al 2012; Behagel et al 2014). 
Employers hiring preferences and practices are likely to constitute a serious limitation on the impact 
that the social investment strategy can have on the integration of immigrants. While there are no easy 
solutions to this problem, the reality of how labour markets work should be more explicitly 
incorporated in the definition of a social investment strategy. 
 
Table 1: Summary of main results of studies on migration and social investment 
Policy sub-field Main results Key references 
Childcare Children with low skilled 
parents and an immigrant 
background are less likely 
to be in centre-based 
childcare.  
Abrassart and Bonoli 2015; Lalive and 
Felfe 2015; Pavolini and Van Lancker 
2018; Schlanser 2011; Van Lancker 
2013; Van Lancker and Ghysels 2012. 
ALMPs Immigrants (or in the US, 
ethnic minorities) are less 
likely to participate in 
ALMPs. 
 
Effect is strongest for 
employment subsidies; 
average for temporary 
employment programmes 
and weaker for training 
Auer and Fossati 2019; Bonoli and 
Liechti, 2018 (Meta-analysis); Heckman 
and Smith 2004 
Access to the labour 
market 
Immigrants from culturally 
distant countries are less 
likely to be invited to job 
interviews in all countries 
for which studies are 
available.  
Ruedin and Zschirnt 2016 ; Quillian et al 






Can the social investment state be made more immigrant friendly? 
 
The literature reviewed above suggests that while theoretically promising, a standard social 
investment approach may fail to integrate individuals with an immigrant background. However, some 
of the problems discussed above can be addressed with adequate policy design (Hemerijcjk 2017). 
While dedicated research on how the design of social investment interventions can reduce access 
biases and employers’ discrimination is still missing, the available evidence points us in a few promising 
directions. 
Conditionality. In social policy the notion of conditionality refers to behaviours that must be adopted 
in order to receive full benefits, most typically, job search efforts. However, conditionality can also be 
used to promote the use of given services. The prime example are “Conditional cash transfer 
programmes” (CCTs). These exist mostly in emerging countries and combine a cash benefit for families 
with particular obligations such as school attendance or medical check-ups for children. Overall, CCTs 
are considered an effective way to help hard to reach populations (Baird et al 2013; Garcia and 
Saavedra 2017). The logic of CCTs has been applied also in Europe, but mostly to niche programmes 
such as cash incentives for pregnant mothers to encourage health check-ups. The logic could be 
extended to other programmes, but would be appropriate only if the cause of underutilization is lack 
of demand (Kis et al 2014). As seen above, both in relation to childcare and ALMPs, lack of demand 
does not seem to be a problem. Instead, insufficient and/or inadequate supply is the most likely culprit. 
Conditionality may play a role in improving immigrant’s access to specific services, but is unlikely on its 
own to solve the access bias problem identified above.  
Increasing supply. If the main obstacle to immigrant participation in relevant programmes is lack of 
supply, then the obvious solution is to increase it. This may reduce the Matthew effects observed in 
childcare. The work by Van Lancker and colleagues suggest that lack of availability is indeed a major 
factor explaining the bias in access to childcare. In their comparison of Sweden and Flanders, two 
territories that have a similar childcare policy, Van Lancker and Ghysel (2012) find that children form a 
disadvantaged background are much more likely to attend in Sweden. They explain this result with 
reference to higher levels of availability. This finding is confirmed in a more extended study of EU 27 
countries, showing again that higher levels of supply are associated with a less pronounced bias (Van 
Lancker 2013). These results are intuitive. If childcare is a scarce resource, access to it will be difficult 
for disadvantaged groups. These studies do not specifically consider immigrant children. However, 
since migration background has been found to limit access to childcare services, we can assume similar 
mechanisms to be at play for immigrant children. 
Increasing supply and guaranteeing universal access to services is probably one of the safest ways to 
minimise the type of access biases that penalise individuals and families with an immigration 
background. This has been convincingly shown in relation to childcare and there is reason to believe 
that it would apply to ALMPs and possibly other social investment interventions. Given that, as seen 
above, Matthew effects in ALMPs seem to be rarer in the Nordic countries, where this policy is most 
developed, supports this interpretation.  
Interventions outside the realm of social policy. Some of the issues discussed above cannot be 
addressed only with social policy interventions. Social investment strategies that improve immigrant 
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integration should include interventions in labour law, equal opportunity policy, and anti-
discrimination policy. Otherwise, as argued above, the risk is the investments made will pay off in a 




It is generally assumed that social investment is a suitable strategy to deal with the challenge 
represented by immigrant integration in multicultural societies. This thematic review has shown that 
this view is not entirely consistent with what we know from empirical studies of policy and on the 
labour market integration of immigrants.  
First, social investment policies in most countries do not seem to reach the most disadvantaged 
populations and immigrants in particular. This is the case both with childcare and ALMPs. An exception 
seems to be the Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, where access biases to key social investment 
policies are less pronounced. These countries seem to be doing slightly better than other countries in 
terms of guaranteeing access to key social investment policies.  
Second, the literature on labour market discrimination reviewed in this article suggests that when it 
comes to immigrant integration, access biases and the Matthew effect are not the only obstacles to 
an effective social investment strategy. Employer discrimination, in fact, could be undermining much 
of the potential benefits of social investment. Social investment policies do not contain an anti-
discrimination component, and simply assume that better human capital will be conducive to better 
access to jobs. Unfortunately, this assumption is not valid for many immigrant groups.  
These observations have implications for research and for policy. With regard to research, we need to 
understand better what causes access biases and how to overcome them. In addition, we need 
research that connects social investment interventions and employers’ recruitment decisions (see 
Fossati and Liechti, this issue). For example, how do social investment interventions impact on 
employers’ perceptions of minority applicants? Can discrimination be reduced by involving employers 
in the design and implementation of social investment policies (Burroni and Scalise, this issue)?  
Social investment interventions remain an attractive strategy to promote immigrant integration and 
successfully manage multicultural societies. However, in order to fully exploit the potential of these 
interventions, policy adaptation is needed. Increasing supply of the relevant services seems to be one 
of the most promising strategies. In addition, employer discrimination should be addressed more 
directly and forcefully. Both research and policy should give more consideration to the role of 
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